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Abstract 
 
 The scope of this paper is to analyze the impact of the implementation of UEFA’s Financial Fair 
Play Regulations on the earnings management behavior of 84 European football clubs, for the 
period under investigation 2009-2011. This study, where earnings management was measured by 
income smoothing and accrual manipulation, indicates that the implementation of UEFA’s 
Financial Fair Play Regulations will increase earning manipulation. Thus, is very important that 
authorities (government, auditors) take all the necessary actions so as to protect shareholder’s 
and various stakeholder’s interests. 
 
KEYWORDS: Earnings management, Earnings quality, UEFA’s Financial Fair Play, Football 
clubs. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
     In the current decade, many European Football clubs have been in financial distress due to the 
increasing expenses that they face. The wider financial crisis has resulted in an increasing 
number of Football Clubs that report financial loss. The crisis appears to have a negatively 
impact on the ability of the clubs to control their costs, as well as in the availability of financing 
and the assessment of their going concern. Under the concept that is well accepted for all 
organizations, clubs cannot spend more than their generated revenues. There are many clubs that 
have violated this concept by spending more than they earn. The financial distress has been 
typical for the European football for the last years. To be more specific, out of the 733 European 
elite division clubs 56% reported net losses during the financial year 2009. This losses increased 
by 85% compared to the previous year 2008. A group of 73 clubs spent more than 100% of their 
revenues on wages alone. And finally should be mentioned that 53% of all clubs reported a 
deteriorated net equity position. During 2009-2010 football clubs across Europe's top divisions 
reported a loss of €1.6bn. The teams that appear to face more financial problems are Manchester 
City and Chelsea which have reported losses of €165m and €65m respectively. Should be 
mentioned thought that the €1.6bn loss was principally due to inflating wages and transfer fees. 
It appears that the clubs' income actually increased, from €12bn in 2008-2009 to €12.8bn while 
their costs were increasing faster, from €13.3bn in 2008-2009 to €14.4bn.1 The financial 
problems of the European football clubs are proliferating every year since 2006. If we take into 
consideration that the reported losses in 2006 were just €216m we will realize how fast the 
situation is worsening.
2
  
     UEFA had realized this worsening situation and starting from the year 2004/2005 introduced 
the Club Licensing System. According to which each club should adopt a series of quality 
standards in order to participate in the UEFA’s championships. These quality standards could be 
categorized into the following groups: sporting, infrastructure, personnel, legal and financial. In 
2009, under the idea of monitoring the financial performance of the clubs UEFA introduced the 
                                                          
1
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2012/jan/25/uefa-sanction-financial-fair-play 
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 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/european/9038245/Uefa-reveal-Europes-top-clubs-made-2010-losses-of-
1.6bn.html 
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Financial Fair Play Regulations (UEFA, 2010a). The regulations aim to bring an end to excessive 
spending, inflated transfer fees and exorbitant player salaries. According to the regulations the 
clubs are obliged, over a period of time, to balance their books or break even. It requires that 
clubs do not spend more than they earn
3
. They require from the clubs to have greater budgeting 
discipline and a more rational financial behavior. The new regulations came into effect in 
January 2012, but will only be imposed in July 2014. During this period, clubs will be allowed to 
run up a maximum of $64 million in losses. Higher-risk clubs that fail certain indicators will also 
be required to provide budgets detailing their strategic plans. The Financial Fair Play Regulations 
requires clubs to spend within a budgetary framework.  They aim to make the European football 
healthier and more viable for the long-term encouraging in this way the investment in youth 
development and sport facilities
4
. As we mentioned, the development and implementation of the 
rules came as a result of the bad financial situation of the European football. An incident which 
contributed in the development and implementation of the regulation was the fact that during 
2008 the aggregate loss of Europe's top clubs was €578 million. It appears that during that year 
47% of clubs reported losses but the fact that 35% of clubs reported negative equity (assets less 
liabilities) in their balance made things even worst
5
. 
     Under the current economic circumstances, it is easier for earnings management to arise. 
Earning is the most important measures for evaluating the firm’s performance. They are used as 
performance measure by a wide range of users like executive compensation plans, in debt 
covenants, in the prospectuses of firms seeking to go public, and by investors and creditors. As a 
result sometimes managers may attempt to manage corporation’s earning in order to improve the 
impression they give, but if doing so leads to excessive earnings management. Earnings 
management is described to be the use of the flexibility in accounting principles that allow 
managers to influence the reported income to be larger or smaller than it would otherwise be. 
Sometimes earnings management causes agency problem which occurs when investors and other 
stakeholders may not be able to make optimal decisions concerning the company based on 
numbers that do not reflect the true financial conditions of the firm Neu (1991). Shareholder 
could be benefit from earnings management only if it is used to give information that are not 
                                                          
3 http://www.uefa.com/uefa/footballfirst/protectingthegame/financialfairplay/news/newsid=1494481.html 
4 http://www.uefa.com/uefa/footballfirst/protectingthegame/financialfairplay/news/newsid=1585317.html 
5
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included in the company’s financial report. Some researches call it beneficial earnings 
management (Subramanyam, 1996). Arya (2003) supports that the spread of information make 
each person to have different piece and none has complete information. As a result, companies 
that manage earnings give more complete information compared with those that do not use 
earnings management. But on the other hand, managers can use earnings management to give 
negative effect on the shareholders by manipulating the company’s performance for their own 
compensation plan. As we mentioned this might cause agency conflict between management and 
shareholders (Holthausen, 1995; DeAngelo, 1988; Dechow and Sloan, 1991). In the current 
decade, the collapse of many firms like Enron, Arthur Anderson and WorldCom led researchers 
to the investigation of earnings management which has become a concern throughout the world. 
     As we mentioned above, corporation attempt to manage their image through earnings and 
thus it is important to understand the processes that may drive to this phenomenon. There are 
many researchers trying to understand these processes. Among the most delighting studies could 
be mentioned those of Schipper (1989), Healy and Wahlen (1999) and Dechow and Skinner 
(2000) that focus on earnings management and the study of Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001) that 
refers to the accounting choices. These studies have created structure in the enormous number of 
articles dedicated to the subject.  
     This study contributes to the existing literature by providing evidence to the assumption that 
the implementation of the Financial Fair Play Regulation will increase earnings management of 
football clubs in order to meet the UEFA’s requirement. At the best of our knowledge there is no 
other study that investigates the impact of the implementation of the Financial Fair Play 
Regulation on earnings management of European football clubs.  The scope of this study is to 
make people that have a stake on football clubs to consider the probability that clubs may 
increase earnings management after the implementation of Financial Fair Play Regulations.  
Beyond doubt, earnings manipulation deteriorates the quality of reported earnings. Siegel (1991) 
in his study highlights characteristics that raise earnings quality. Among them, he mentioned the 
degree to which the true economic reality of the firm is reflected to its reported earnings. 
Earnings quality is even more important for large-size firms like football clubs because there are 
many stakeholders like shareholders or investment analysts that make investment decisions 
based on this information (reported earnings). They will be malcontent to know that the reported 
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earnings of the club do not reflect its true economic situation and may not invest again in this 
firm. Being a public visible firm also attract the attention of the government because firms like 
this affect a quite large percentage of the society (people that work for this firm or people that 
have invested in this firm) and government should protect the interest of these people. 
Furthermore, auditors should be more careful when audit large-size firm because these firms 
have more sophisticated tools to manipulate their earnings. 
     The rest of the paper is organized as follows: first a discussion of the relevant literature on 
definition of earnings management, motives for earnings management and ways of detecting 
earnings management. At the second part we give a brief overview of the Financial Fair Play 
Regulation. The third part is dedicated at the statement of the main research hypothesis. In the 
fourth part there is the description of the data used in the study and the methodological 
framework. The fifth part represents the empirical results and finally the sixth part shows the 
main conclusions, policy implications and suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review  
 
     In this part of the paper we represent a literature review of the definition of earnings 
management, the motives that appear to increase the level of earnings manipulation and finally 
the ways that are discovered in detecting earnings management. 
2.1 Definition 
     Earnings management has been defined by many researchers in several different ways but 
Schipper (1989) defined Earnings Management as "... a purposeful intervention in the external 
financial reporting process, with inventing of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to merely 
facilitating the natural operation of the process)". Also, Healy and Whalen (1999) said "Earnings 
management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers". Ronen and Sadan (1981) argue that managers smooth income 
either by allocating the effect of transactions over time to change the income of particular 
periods, or via classifications of non-recurring items. Healy and Wahlen (1999), Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1995), and also Dechow and Skinner (2000) claim that earnings management can be done 
through faster selling, change product shipping schedule, slowing research and development’s 
expenses and also maintenance’s expenses. On the other hand, Lo (2007) supported that earnings 
management could be grouped in two categories, real earnings management which affects cash 
flow, and accrual management which can be done through changes in accounting estimation and 
policies but do not affect the company’s cash flow. Both groups of earnings management have 
different cost, on the company but the real earnings management affects more the corporation 
Roychowdhury (2006). The research of Bruns and Merchant (1990) and Graham (2005) supports 
that managers tend to use real earnings management rather than accrual management because 
accrual manipulation is considered to causes higher risk. There is also the study of Jiraporn 
(2006) who categorize earnings management into two groups: beneficial earnings management 
and opportunistic earnings management. In order to consider the earnings management useful it 
should be used in order to communicate private information that manager has about company’s 
prospect (Arya, Glover and Sunder, 2003; Demski, 1998; Subramanyam. 1996; Watts and 
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Zimmerman, 1986). On the contrary, in order to consider earnings management as opportunistic 
the manager should use it for his own benefit as Healy and Palepu (1993) support. 
     Earnings manipulation is done by the managers of the company in many different ways. This 
is possible because of the fact that managers are responsible for estimating future economic 
events which are reflected in the financial reports such as expected lives and salvage values of 
long term assets, deferred taxes, losses from bad debt and asset impairment, obligations for 
pension benefits and other post employment benefits. Managers must also choose among 
acceptable accounting methods such as the straight line or depreciation methods or the LIFO, 
FIFO, or the weighted average inventory cost methods. Preparing financial statement under 
General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) guidelines provide flexibility in reporting 
economic and coupled with market reliance on short-term profitability, makes earnings 
management practically irresistible. Under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), 
corporations through accrual accounting recognize the financial effects on an entity of 
transactions and other events. The nature of accrual accounting provides managers with a great 
deal of discretion in determining the reported earnings of the firm in any given period. 
     Another point to note in our definition is the objective of earnings management to mislead the 
stakeholder about the economic performance of the company. This can occur when managers 
have access to information that are not available to outside stakeholders or when managers 
believe that stakeholders cannot undo earnings management. Based on the market efficiency 
theory the security prices are based on the available financial information. To be more specific, 
investors use financial information to decide whether to buy, sell, or hold securities. When the 
information is incorrect, it may not be possible for the investors to value securities correctly. 
     To sum up, management’s use of judgment in financial reporting has costs and benefits. The 
costs include the potential misallocation of resources that arises from earnings management and 
benefits include potential improvements in management’s credible communication of private 
information to external stakeholders. Thus, is very important for standard setters to understand 
when standards that permit to exercise judgment in reporting increase the value of accounting 
information to users or they reduce it. 
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2.2 Motives for earnings management 
     The interaction among earnings and stock markets reaction can indeed push management 
towards earnings management. Stock market is really risky and that is why investors rely on 
analyst’s forecasts about the performance of the stock market. As a consequence, companies try 
to meet/beat the analysts’ forecasts to have higher return (Bartov, 2002). In order to do so, the 
manager of the company sometimes involves in earnings management. There have been several 
research papers trying to find out why managers try to meet or beat expectations as well as to 
find evidence which prove that they use earnings management to reach this benchmark. If the 
company fails to meet the analyst’s forecasts then it will have a negative impact on its stock 
return as well as the manager’s compensation (Matsunaga and Park, 2001). Payne and Robb 
(2000) supported that the more the analysts agree about the future of the company the stronger 
will be the incentive for the company to meet these forecasts.  The existence of the relationship 
between forecasts and earnings management make it possible for the researchers to detect those 
companies that are likely to involve in earnings manipulation. Kasznik (1999) agrees with the 
research of Burgstahler and Eames (1998) which argued that firms manage earnings to meet 
financial analysts’ forecasts. In this signaling framework, Moses (1987) finds that managers 
report earnings that are closer to expectations and that incentives to smooth income increase 
when there is divergence between actual and expected earnings. Burgstahler and Eames (2003) 
also support in their research that firms manipulate their earnings because they do not wish to 
report small losses or earnings decreases. Matsumoto (2002) at her study tried to find out the 
characteristics of firms that might involve in earnings management to avoid negative earnings 
surprises finding that firms with higher institutional ownership and firms who rely on implicit 
claims with their stakeholders are the firms that engage more in earnings management. On the 
other hand, Ghosh et al. (2005) suggests that companies with an increase in earnings and 
revenues are less suspicious for earnings manipulation. 
     There are studies that have find out direct link between the earnings management and the 
financial benefit of the firm’s management. Earnings management’s connection with insider 
trading is documented by Beneish and Vargus (2002), Park and Park (2004) and Cheng and 
Warfield (2005). In compliance with this study there is the research of Healy (1985) which 
associates bonus contracts with earnings management. It seems to be another relationship 
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between earnings management and stock compensation through stock options (Baker, 2003; 
Bartov and Mohanram, 2004; Kwon and Yin, 2006).  
     Deangelo (1988) refers in the existence of earnings management in buyout cases, Teoh, 
Welch and Wong (1998a-b), Rangan (1998) and Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) also 
suggested that firms manage earnings prior to seasoned equity offers and IPO’s. The same 
conclusion made DuCharme (2001) and Shivakumar (2000) at their studies. Teoh, Welch and 
Wong (1998a-b), Rangan (1998) and Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) at their study also 
support that managers want to manage pre-issue earnings in order to improve investors’ 
expectations about future performance. However, seems to be a cost associated with earnings 
management. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998b) supports that companies that have engaged in 
earnings management prior to their initial public equity offerings experience poor stock return 
performance in the following three years. Despite the equity offering, a share repurchase is also a 
reason for engaging in earnings manipulation. Vafeas (2003) at his study found evidence that 
managers reduce earnings through accruals before stock repurchase. Bens (2003) supports that 
managers use the process of share repurchase as an earnings manipulation tool when the 
company’s earnings are below the desired level and its earnings per share is lower. But Larcker 
(2003) questioned these results as he claimed that this is not correct procedure for managing 
earnings and supported that managers do not use such procedures.  
     As we mentioned above, earnings management is defined as process of altering financial 
information in order to achieve certain goals.  One of these goals seems to be the fact that 
managers through earnings management are signaling private information to the public.  There 
are many articles dedicated to that motive such as the research of Rosner (2003) who examined 
the fact that firms that are about to go bankrupt engage in earnings management in order to hide 
their bad economic condition. Louis and Robinson (2005) suggest that through accrual (in 
combination with stock split) managers provide private information to the public. They support 
that it is the only way managers communicate their optimistic view about the company’s future. 
There are occasions that the firm fail to inform the public for the true goal of their accounting 
practices.  In the line with this fact is the study of Shane and Stock (2006) who find evidence that 
analyst do not identify the change in earnings policy as an optimal tax planning and these firms 
may be penalized by the market for this change in their tax planning strategy. Furthermore, 
Tucker and Zarowin (2006) also supported that managers engage in earnings manipulation in 
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order to reveal information about the future performance of the company concerning its expected 
earnings and cash flows. 
   Firms, through earnings manipulation, try to influence other stakeholders that use its financial 
report in order to make decisions. Among these stakeholders the most important seems to be the 
government. Since it is believed that a firm could involve in earnings management in order to 
avoid governmental interference.  Haw et al (2005) researched for increasing earnings 
manipulation in China as a response to the regulation that the government had made which 
requires that if a firm want to issue bond or offer shares should maintain a ten percent return on 
equity.  Johnston and Rock (2005) studied decreasing earnings management in companies that 
are threatened by the Superfund Act. It is obvious that when earnings are the basis of tax 
calculation then companies may engage in earnings manipulation in order to avoid paying tax 
(Monem, 2003). 
     Furthermore, there are articles that provide evidence of earnings manipulation when the 
company changes its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Godfrey (2003). It seems like the new CEO 
indicate that the company engage in downwards earnings manipulation in the year of change and 
upwards earnings manipulation in the following years. Also it is possible that the company 
manipulate more its earnings when its CEO is retiring as Reitenga and Tearny (2003) claimed at 
their study. It seems like the CEO that is retiring use upwards earnings management in order to 
give a good impression about his performance on the company and maybe get a sit on the board 
of the company. 
     Except for its external stakeholders, the earnings of a company are used as a measure of 
performance also in the intra-company evaluation. A corporation may manage its earnings in 
order to avoid budget ratcheting. Leone and Rock (2002) searched the accruals of several 
companies in order to study the effect of budget ratcheting on earnings manipulation. The 
hypothesis that under the ratchet effect, managers will choose to use income-decreasing 
unexpected accruals when the earnings innovations are transitory is supported by their empirical 
evidence. 
     Murphy (2001) studied the link between the nature of performance standards in incentive 
contracts and earnings smoothing. He supported that companies which use externally determined 
standards are less likely to smooth earnings than those companies that use internal standards. 
10 
 
     According to Beidleman (1973) and Lipe (1990) through earnings management managers 
reduce the variability of earnings minimizing in this way the uncertainty of the shareholders. 
However, it is said that abnormal accruals tend to reverse over time being detectable by 
investors. On the other hand, Schipper and Vincent (2003) claim that manipulating earnings in 
contravention of sound accounting practices adversely affects shareholders.  
     There seem to be many motivations that lead to earnings management. Healy and Whalen 
(1999) summarize the major motivations to manage earnings which are: 
 Public offerings (enhancing financial reports prior to an IPO or secondary equity offering 
to attract better valuations),  
 Executive compensation (increasing reported earnings to increase executive bonuses), 
 Financial liabilities (fulfilling financial requirements in loan covenants, 
 Regulation (Reducing regulation costs or enhancing regulatory benefits) 
 
     The research of Defond and Jiambavlo (1994) associated earnings management with debt 
covenants. It is claimed that earnings management is done to avoid rules breaking in a loan 
contract, reduce regulatory cost, or increase regulatory benefit (Cornett, 2008). Trueman and 
Titman (1988) suggest that sometimes managers seem to smooth income in order to make the 
firm appear a less risky investment than it really is. Beneish (2001) claimed that an insider 
trading should be added to the list of motives for earnings management. The concept behind this 
is the fact that if managers are aware of mis-statement of profits, they can benefit by trading the 
securities.  
     Easterwood (1997), and Erickson and Wang (1999) supported that one reason for earnings 
management is when companies are about to involve in takeover or merger settings. The former 
has found evidence that targets of hostile takeover involve in earnings management in the period 
prior to the takeover. In the case of mergers it has been found that firms engaging in stock for 
stock mergers manipulate their earnings before the merger because they want to inflate the 
company’s stock price reducing in this way the cost of the merger.   
     There is evidence suggesting that earnings management it is also done by the major 
shareholder and may cause loss for the minor shareholder. Johnson (2000) refers to this as 
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“tunneling” which is the transfer of the company’s resources to major shareholder’s benefit. 
Many companies of developing countries are doing tunneling activities. Thus, the companies that 
do tunneling will involve in earnings management more that the companies that do not. 
2.3 Detecting earnings management 
     Earnings Management has been identified when earnings indirectly or directly affect share 
price, proxy fights, labor contracts, equity issues management compensation or government 
regulations. Earnings manipulation has the propensity to deceive and that is why it is difficult to 
detect it. It has been studied from diverse perspectives: income smoothing Moses (1987), and 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), management compensation Healy (1985), McNichols and 
Wilson (1988), Holthausen (1995), and Gaver, Gaver and Austin (1995), ownership control or 
management buyout DeAngelo (1986 and 1988) and Perry and Williams (1994), political costs 
issues Liberty and Zimmerman (1986), Jones (1991), Cahan (1992), and Maydew (1997) and 
equity issues Aharony, Lin and Loeb (1993),  Friedlan (1994), Loughran and Ritter (1995 and 
1997), Rangan (1998), Teoh (1998), Shivakumar (2000), and Yoon and Miller (2002a). Gaver 
(1995) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) found evidence of earnings management consistent 
with income smoothing.  
     Hayn (1995), Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Degeorge (1999) at their papers supported that 
there are unusual patterns in the distribution of earnings levels, earnings changes, and earnings 
surprises. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), in particular, show that firms avoid negative earnings. 
They present nonparametric evidence that the distribution of earnings is ‘‘bunched’’ just above 
zero. Degeorge (1999) shows that the distribution of earnings bunches at a number of points: 
above zero earnings, above the level of earnings necessary to have stable or growing earnings, 
and above analysts’ forecasts.  
     Early studies tested the connection between managerial incentives and choices of different 
accounting methods (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979). However, 
changes in accounting methods are easy for outsiders to detect and therefore have limited success 
in misleading them. Prior researches have more practical method for detecting earnings 
management. There are factors that seem to be associated with financial reporting irregularities 
(Jones, 2008). Specifically, firm size, profitability, leverage and the presence of Big 4 auditor 
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seem to be one of those. The firm’s operating risk seems to be another indication for earnings 
manipulation (Hribar, 2010). Hilary and Hui (2009) suggest that religiosity influences managers’ 
decisions in a risky operating environment. These papers have inspired a large literature 
investigating various aspects of managers’ incentives to meet or beat simple earnings 
benchmarks.  
     The most often used method to determine the level of earnings management is discretionary 
accruals method. Earnings could be distinguished in two components, cash and accounting 
adjustment known as accruals. Managers can easily affect the direction and measurement of 
accruals. The total accruals could be grouped in two components, discretionary accruals and non-
discretionary accruals. According to existing studies the modified Jones (1991) model is a very 
important tool in detecting earnings management. This approach is considered to have “the most 
power in detecting earnings management” Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) and “only the 
Jones and modified Jones models appear to have the potential to provide reliable estimates of 
discretionary accruals” Guay, Kothari and Watts (1996). If the sample has positive discretionary 
accruals shows that companies have engaged in increasing income manipulation. On the 
contrary, if the sample has negative amount of discretionary accruals that indicates that the 
companies involve in decreasing income manipulation. 
     There are difficulties in detecting earnings management. As we have mentioned above, 
managers use real decision in order to manipulate earnings (for example by reducing research 
and development or advertising expenditures). This could be a methodological problem that 
researchers face according to Dechow and Sloan (1991), Bushee (1998), Rowchowdhury (2004), 
Graham (2005). Through ‘real’ earnings management the managers affect cash flows as well as 
accruals making it difficult for researchers to document earnings manipulation. 
     In some studies it is documented that discretionary accruals models have low power in 
detecting earnings management and can yield biased results for samples of firms with extreme 
earnings performance (Dechow, 1995; Guay, 1996; Kothari, 2005). Also Yu (2008) at his study 
has spotted some weakness of the discretionary accruals model in detecting earnings 
manipulation. This weaknesses seems to be the fact that for the companies that are doing mergers 
and acquisitions or the companies that discontinue in operation as well as the companies that 
have significant activities abroad it is inaccurate to used the balance sheet approach to check the 
13 
 
accruals usage and secondly, the discretionary accruals will over estimate a company with an 
extreme performance, rapid growth and volatile cash flow.  
     Finally, it is also difficult for the researchers to determine the way that managers achieve 
certain patterns in earnings distribution as Beaver (2003) and Dechow (2003) support at their 
studies. 
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Chapter 3: UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations 
 
     In the last decade, the number of football clubs that have reported financial losses is 
increasing. The current financial crisis has created difficult market condition for the European 
football clubs, which has a negative impact on revenue generation. Also it creates additional 
challenges for clubs regarding the availability of financing day-to-day operations. The UEFA 
(Union of European Football Associations) is concerned about this development of the European 
football. The majority of the football clubs have reported deficits which led them face high debt 
level. For example, Manchester United, the most valuable soccer club in the world at $1.86 
billion, has debts of $756 million as a result of the 2005 takeover by American businessman 
Malcolm Glazer.
6
 High leveraged clubs, unavoidably, experienced liquidity shortfalls that 
resulted to the delayed payment not only of other clubs but also to the payment of employees, 
national social insurance fees, and social/tax authorities. As a result, football clubs are facing 
work stoppages, bankruptcies and spiraling debts which seriously affect playing on the field. On 
the contrary, there are football clubs that have overcome these liquidity problems with the help 
of external money that the patron gives them. One of the best known example is FC Chelsea 
which received about half a billion Euros from its patron. This situation is considered to have a 
negative impact on the European football systems because a few richest clubs drive up players’ 
salaries and transfer costs, forcing smaller clubs to over-stretch their budgets to compete
7
. 
Consequently, there is a huge gap between rich-big clubs (including FC Barcelona, Real Madrid, 
Manchester United, FC Chelsea, AC Milan or Bayern Munich and others, called the 
“Untouchables” by Deloitte) and small one. The ‘Untouchables’ will continue to move further 
away from other clubs until the gap can no longer be closed .  As we can see at the figure below 
there is a huge difference between the revenue of the “Untouchables” and the revenue of the 
small clubs during the financial year 2009/2010.                                                                       
 
 
 
                                                          
6
  Natalie L. St. Cyr. Clarke, Note, The Beauty and the Beast: Taming the  Ugly Side of the People’s Game, 17 Colum. J. Eur. L. 
601, 601 (2011) 
7
 http://swissramble.blogspot.gr/2012/09/uefas-ffp-regulations-play-to-win.html 
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 Figure 1: Total Revenues of football clubs for 2009/2010
8
 
     These developments threaten the financial stability and distorted the competitive balance not 
only between clubs but also between leagues in European football. Requested and consulted by 
the football family, UEFA is introducing sensible and achievable measures in order restore the 
competitive balance. 
     In September 2009, Financial Control Panel of UEFA, agreed about the UEFA’s Financial 
Fair Play Regulations which intended to prevent professional football clubs to spend more than 
they actually earn so as not to get into financial problems which could threaten their long term 
survival. Even if the term Fair play appears to be funny its crucial aspect is the idea of equal 
opportunities (Lenk and Pilz, 1989), which nowadays is difficult to be fulfilled by European 
football clubs. 
                                                          
8
 Source: Deloitte (2011). 
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     UEFA Executive Committee approved the formation of the two-chamber Club Financial 
Control Body (CFCB) in June 2012 which replaced the Club Financial Control Panel in order to 
oversee the application of the UEFA Club Licensing System and Financial Fair Play 
Regulations. The Club Financial Control Panel, which had monitored clubs since the first 
introduction of the regulations in May 2010, with the main evolution being that the CFCB is an 
UEFA Organ for the Administration of Justice. It is also competent to impose disciplinary 
measures in case that football clubs does not fulfill the requirements, and to decide on cases 
relating to clubs’ eligibility for UEFA club competitions. 
     UEFA, through the Financial Fair Play Regulations, obligates the football clubs to balance 
their book or break even over a period of time. According to the “breakeven requirement” the 
“relevant expenses” should not exceed the club’s “relevant revenue”. We should note that 
UEFA’s notion of “relevant income” does not include income from non football operations. 
Externally acquired money from the club’s patrons, is not considered as income and cannot be 
used to finance a club’s expenditures unless it is used for youth development activities or 
infrastructure. The Financial Fair Play measures involve a multi-year assessment, enabling a 
longer-term view to be formed and within the wider context of European football. They reach 
beyond the existing UEFA club licensing system criteria that are primarily designed to enable an 
assessment of a club's financial situation in the short term, and is primarily administered by the 
governing bodies in each UEFA national association.   
     According to the Financial Fair Play Regulation the “break-even requirement” is assessed by 
UEFA for a three-year period according to Article 59 (UEFA 2010a). For example, for the 
license season 2014/15 the monitoring period to be assessed includes the three previous seasons 
2013/14, 2012/13 and 2011/12. The new regulations came into effect in January 2012 (UEFA 
2011a).  The first season that UEFA will start monitoring clubs is 2013/14 (it is the only year 
that UEFA will be based only on information of the two preceding years, namely 2011/12 and 
2012/13).  Should be mentioned that, the break-even rule have to be fulfilled every year for a 
moving average over three years. The restriction of the moving average ensures that, although 
there is a continuous limit, club’s managers can make adjustments over these three years. 
     According to Article 61, there is an acceptable deviation of 5 million Euros from the 
breakeven point. This deviation is allowed to be up to 45 million Euros in the license seasons 
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2013/14 and 2014/15. This amount will be reduced to 30 million Euros for the license seasons 
2015/16, 2016/17 and 2017/18, and will be reduced further thereafter. According to the Financial 
Fair Play Regulations, wealthy owners will be allowed to absorb the aggregate losses of 45 or 30 
million Euros by making equity contributions not just by lending money to the clubs. This 
exception allows clubs that are financed by private investors to change their management policy. 
The Financial Fair Play Regulations is expected to prevent wealthy club owners who make cash 
gifts to their club from gaining an advantage over other clubs which cannot afford this kind of 
gifts. Also, sanctions are taken against those clubs who do not spend within a budgetary 
framework. Among the penalties for the clubs that not comply with the Financial Fair Play 
Regulations we could mention the disqualification from European competitions, fines, the 
withholding of prize money and transfer bans. 
    Michel Platini, the President of UEFA when he announced the new legislation said: 
‘’Fifty per cent of clubs are losing money and this is an increasing trend. We needed to stop this 
downward spiral. They have spent more than they have earned in the past and haven’t paid their 
debts. We don't want to kill or hurt the clubs; on the contrary, we want to help them in the 
market. The teams who play in our tournaments have unanimously agreed to our 
principles…living within your means is the basis of accounting but it hasn't been the basis of 
football for years now. The owners are asking for rules because they can't implement them 
themselves - many of them have had it with shoveling money into clubs and the more money you 
put into clubs, the harder it is to sell at a profit.’’ 
The main objectives of the Financial Fair Play Regulations according to UEFA 2010b were: 
I. to introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finances, 
II. to decrease pressure on salaries and transfer fees and limit inflationary effect, 
III. to encourage clubs to compete with(in) their revenues, 
IV. to encourage long-term investments in the youth sector and infrastructure, 
V. to protect the long-term viability of European club football, 
VI. to ensure clubs settle their liabilities on a timely basis. 
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     We could summarize the main objectives of the Financial Fair Play Regulations in the 
following two principal goals: 
1. Protecting the long-term financial stability of European club football; 
2. Restoring the competitive balance between clubs and leagues. 
     The effect of the adaption of the Financial Play Regulations will be permanent affecting the 
competition between football clubs and leagues. It is believed that although the short term 
transition will be difficult for the clubs the football finally will benefit in the long term 
(especially the competition between football clubs). There are clubs, though, that will be affected 
more than others from the implementation of the new regulations. These clubs used to be 
financed primarily through donors by their patrons. On the other hand, the new regulations will 
be implemented easer in national champions that have tighter regulations (for example the 
German championship) gaining, in this way, competitiveness against less regulated leagues (like 
the English or Spanish championship).  Should be mentioned that, the FFP will also affect the 
competition between clubs on the national league because the will be less contestable due to the 
restriction of the getting external money. 
     There are advantages and disadvantages in the implementation of the Financial Fair Play 
Regulations as Henning Vopel (2011) suggest in his report. According to the author before the 
application of new rules authorities should investigate whether it is:  
 effective with respect to the objectives of regulation 
 not contradictory with respect to different objectives of regulation 
 efficient regarding costs of implementing, monitoring and enforcing regulation 
 dynamically efficient by offering incentives for long-term improvement  
 competitively neutral unless otherwise intended by the regulation itself  
 of reasonable means regarding costs and benefits of regulation. 
     As we mentioned above, the main criteria of the Financial Fair Play Regulations is the 
breakeven point that clubs should comply with in order to get the license. As we also mentioned 
the major objective of the implementation of the Financial Fair Play Regulations is to restore the 
competition between clubs and maintain long-term financial stability of the football clubs in 
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Europe. The most important question arising is whether the breakeven point is efficient regarding 
these two main objectives. Undoubtedly, it helps in maintaining log-term financial stability 
because it puts a limit in the losses that clubs can report. But, as far as the restoring competition 
between clubs is concerned, there are objections claiming that the clubs that cannot have access 
to external money will face high level of debt which as a result will make these clubs suffer a 
competitive disadvantage. On the other hand, Henning Vopel (2011) supports that the long-term 
competitive equilibrium in the European football is determined by the size of the revenue that a 
club could generate rather than on occasional investors. The size of the revenue unavoidably 
depends on the size of the domestic market of the club (population size and income per capita). 
Thus, football clubs of developed countries will continue to have a competitive advantage 
against those of less-developed one. 
      Additionally, one of the most important problems that European football faces, as we 
mentioned, is the fact that there are “Untouchables’’ clubs which tend to transfer the leagues into 
monopolies. These clubs have high revenue due to their initial success which, as a consequence, 
strengthens more these clubs leading to another success. In football it is believed that ‘money 
score’ which means that football clubs who have money have the opportunity to acquire the best 
players, coaches and managers, making success much more likely. It could be easily understood 
that European football needs a redistribution of income in order to avoid the dominance of a few 
football clubs which violate the foundation of sport. The breakeven point does not really help in 
improving this situation. Thus, the UEFA should adopt a mechanism which will solve this 
problem.   
     Moreover, the adaption of the Financial Fair Play Regulation will increase the cost of 
implementing for the clubs and monitoring for the authorities. There are clubs that will try to 
report income of non-football operation as relevant income. Furthermore, it is believed that the 
implementation of the new regulation will increase earnings manipulation by the managers of the 
clubs. Thus, the cost of detecting such behavior will obviously be higher than before the 
implementation of the Financial Fair Play Regulations when managers of the clubs had no 
incentives to manipulate their earnings.  
     To sum up, the UEFA implemented the Financial Fair Play Regulations in order to restore 
competition in the European football as well as to maintain a long-term financial stability of 
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these clubs. The UEFA intent to achieve that through the introduction of the breakeven point 
according to which clubs are allowed to report certain amount of losses during a three year 
period. If they fail to comply with this regulation they will not participate in the UEFA’s 
championship. It appears, though, that the new regulation have advantages and disadvantages. 
On the one hand, they indeed enhance the long-term financial stability of the clubs through 
imposing a ceiling on deficits but on the other hand it appears to be inefficient in rebalancing 
competition. Furthermore it fails to solve the problem of the monopolies that European football 
faces. And finally, it seems to be costly for the clubs to apply the new regulation and for the 
authorities to detect earnings manipulation. 
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Chapter 4: Research hypothesis  
 
     In this part of the paper we will proceed with the examination of the main research hypothesis 
which is whether the implementation of the Financial Fair Play Regulations increases earnings 
management. We also control for other variables that appears to affect earnings management 
based on previous literature review. These control variables are firm’s size, leverage, growth, 
cash flow and whether it is a listed firm or not. 
4.1 Size 
     Firm size affects earnings management as Becker (1998) has noticed. Two opposing views 
exist on the role of firm size in earnings management as discussed below. The larger the firm 
size, the less earnings management may be feasible as Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) refer to 
their research. The main idea behind this view is the fact that the size of a firm is related to its 
internal control system. That means that large-sized firms appears to have more sophisticated 
internal control systems as compared to small-sized firms reducing in this way the likelihood of 
manipulating earnings by management. Furthermore, large-sized firms are usually audited by 
auditors from big 4 accounting firms. This audit firms have more experienced auditors who 
could help prevent earnings misrepresentation. To be more specific, Becker (1998), Francis 
(1999), and Payne and Robb (2000) claimed that the firms audited by big 4 audit firms appears to 
report lower levels of discretionary accruals even though they have high level of accruals. It is 
also believed that large-sized firms take into account the reputation costs when engaging in 
earnings management. These firms have better control over their operations appreciations and 
understanding of their businesses relative to small-sized firms. Moreover, large firms have 
established their credibility in business community and hence, the cost of engaging in earnings 
management will be higher for them. As a consequence, their concern about reputation prevents 
these firms from manipulating earnings. And finally, large firms are followed by more financial 
analyst and that may be the reason why they avoid involving in earnings management.  
     On the other hand, there is an opposing view suggesting that large-sized firms are more likely 
to manage earnings than small-sized firms. As Barton and Simko (2002) indicated, the reason 
behind this is the fact that large firms face more pressures to meet the analysts' expectations. In 
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the same line is the research of Myers and Skinner (2000) who found empirical evidence that 
large firms do not report accurate earnings after studying their earnings growth for at least 14 
quarters. Moreover, large firms seem to have greater bargaining power with auditors. As Nelson 
(2002) documented, auditors are more likely to waive earnings management attempts by large 
clients. Also, large firms appear to have more room to maneuver given wide range of accounting 
treatments available for example they have greater current assets, i.e. better ability, to do 
earnings management than small firms. Finally, large-sized firms may manage earnings to 
decrease political costs. In all, the incentives and abilities to manage earnings may vary among 
firms of different sizes.  
     Kim, Liu and Rhee (2003) find that small firms engage more in earnings management than 
large- or medium-sized firms to avoid reporting losses. On the other hand, large- and medium-
sized firms exhibit more aggressive earnings management to avoid reporting earnings decreases 
than small-sized firms. A reasonable explanation for that they mentioned that may be the fact 
that it is easier for large firms to report positive earnings than positive change in earnings, while 
small firms may not have the same capacity as large firms in reporting positive earnings. 
     In this research we control for size using the natural logarithm of total assets and we expect a 
negative association between earnings management and firm size. 
4.2 Leverage 
     Highly leveraged companies may be at risk of bankruptcy or be unable to find new lenders in 
the future if they are unable to make payments on their external debt financing. It seems to be a 
positive/negative association between earnings management and leveraged firms. Positive 
association can be justified as follows: if a firm is highly leveraged, managers have to meet the 
expectations of investors/lenders and consequently engage in income increasing accruals. 
According to the research of Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) firms with high leverage 
ratio engage more in upward earnings management because they want to avoid debt covenant 
violations. In the same line is also the research of Billings (1999). On the contrary, leverage 
seems to increases the control of opportunistic behavior of managers. This is due to the fact that 
highly leveraged firms use huge amount of free cash flows in order to repay their loans. As a 
result, managers are left with less free cash flows and they do not invest in value decreasing 
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projects due to the lack of free cash. This fact leads managers to depend upon earnings 
management to hide their poor performance.  
     Have been many studies trying to identify the type of correlation between earnings 
management and leverage. Jelinek (2007) studies the effect of leverage increase on accrual-based 
earnings management. Jelinek suggests that leverage levels have a different impact on earnings 
management and concludes that increased leverage is associated with reduced accrual-based 
earnings management. Wasimullah, Toor and Abbas (2010) in their paper compared the impact 
of leverage on earnings management in control as well as leverage increasing firms. They found 
out that as leverage increases firm’s earnings management reduces and thus supports negative 
relationship between earnings management and firm leverage. On the other hand, there are 
findings that are not consistent with the idea of negative relationship of earnings management 
and firms leverage. They support that firms engage in earnings management to avoid debt 
covenant default. Beatty and Weber (2003), DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), Dichev and Skinner 
(2002) and Sweeney (1994) mentioned that the debt repayments of the loan that companies has 
granted decrease the amount of cash available to managers for investing in non-value increasing 
projects. This has been also documented by Jensen (1986), Maloney et al (1993) and Stulz 
(1990). 
     To be consistent with previously studies we have used the ratio of long term debt to the total 
of book value of equity as measure of leverage in this paper. The same measure had been used 
by Hayn et al (1992), Nwaeze (2005) and Jelinek (2007). This book value of debt has the 
capacity to better explain the indebtness of firm as market value of debt may be inflated due to 
share prices. We expect a positive association between earnings management and leverage. 
4.3 Growth 
     Prior empirical studies associate earnings management with expected future growth.  It is 
believed that discretionary accruals estimated from Jones models are correlated with 
performance and expected future earnings growth. Lee, Li, and Yu (2006) at their study 
supported that higher growth firms are involving more in earnings management. At the same line 
are the studies of Gaver and Gaver (1993), Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker (2002), Iyengar, Land, 
and Zampelli (2010), Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003), and  Clinch (1991), who claimed that the 
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higher the firm’s growth opportunities is, the stronger the incentives it has to meet the analysts’ 
forecasts mitigating sometimes in earnings management in order to do so. 
     Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) and Kasznik (1999) document that discretionary accruals 
estimated from the Jones model are positively related to return of assets. McNichols (2000) 
further shows that discretionary accruals from both the Jones model and the modified Jones 
model are positively related with earnings growth. Lee, Yue and Yue (2005) also support that 
firms with higher performance or expected earnings growth over-report earnings by a larger 
amount. One possible explanation for the above phenomenon seems to be the fact that Jones 
models are mis-specified in identifying non-discretionary accruals caused by performance 
increase or sales growth. Following researchers try to mitigate the misspecification concern by 
adding more controls such as the company’s cash flows. 
     Sales growth may affect the propensities of firms to manage earnings. High sales growth 
usually improves the bottom line in income statement that is controlled by the variable, earnings 
performance in previous years, so the firms with high sales growth may not necessarily 
manipulate earnings to report positive earnings or change in earnings. Given the earnings 
performance, however, the high-growth firms would aggressively recognize revenues in order to 
maintain the growth trend, particularly with a series of consecutive increases in sales. Myers and 
Skinner (2000) observe, for example, that their sample firms have higher sales growth rates than 
the firms in the control group. So it becomes necessary to control for sales growth to isolate the 
relation between firm size and earnings management.  
     In this study, observations are divided into three groups based on the sales growth rate, 
calculated as current period sales minus last period sales divided by last period sales. Two 
dummy variables representing for medium- and high-growth rates are included in the model 
while the low-growth group serves as the base group. Consequently, we predict football clubs 
with increased growth prospects to manipulate accounting numbers more frequently and so the 
GR coefficient is expected to be positive. 
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4.4 Cash flows 
     As we already mentioned above, firm’s manager engage in earnings management.9 One way 
managers can manage earnings is by manipulating accruals (pure accrual manipulation) which 
has not direct consequences to cash flows. Because pure accrual manipulation has no direct 
implication to cash flows and can be done after the end of the year when the managers are better 
informed about pre managed earnings, this is a very convenient form of earnings management. 
Examples of pure earnings manipulation include the under provision for bad debt expenses, 
opportunistic selection of accounting methods and delaying of asset write-offs. Real activity 
manipulation affects both cash flows and accruals. 
     Managers have incentives to use methods other than pure accruals manipulation to manage 
earnings which is related with the timing of earnings management. In contrast to pure accrual 
management, any other manipulation of real activities has to occur during the course of the year. 
In order to avoid reporting losses, the first option is to wait until the end of the year to use pure 
accruals manipulation to cover the shortfall between pre-managed earnings and zero. But, this 
strategy entails the risk that the realized shortfall at year-end is larger than the discretionary 
accruals that can be reported with pure accruals manipulation. The result will be to report 
earnings below zero. Managers can reduce this risk by manipulating real activities during the 
year by increasing reported earnings. 
     Prior studies provide strong evidence on the existence of real earnings management (RM). 
Graham (2004) reported that 78% of the executives interviewed indicated a willingness to 
sacrifice economic value to manage financial reporting perceptions. By definition, real earnings 
management impacts negatively future firm performance because managers are willing to 
sacrifice future cash flows for current period income. However, the extent to which various real 
earnings management impacts future operating performance has not been discussed in prior 
literature. 
     Sugata Roychowdhury (2003) detected abnormally low CFO for companies that report small 
positive profits at the annual level. The evidence is consistent with firms which increase reported 
earnings beyond zero by giving price discount to temporally boost sales and overproduction. 
                                                          
9 Healy (1985), Guidry, Leone and Rock (1999), Defond and Jiambalvo (1994), Teo, Welch and Wong (1998) and Kaznik 
(1999). 
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     Operating cash flow and earnings Operating cash flow, (OCFi,t/TAi,t−1), is likely to be 
negatively related to income-boosting. One reason is that changes in credit terms, if any, convert 
cash income into accruals or vice versa; a second reason is management’s desire to smooth out 
other variations in cash earnings. We further include earnings before taxes (Earni,t/TAi,t−1), 
scaled by lagged total assets, to control for potential misspecification that may occur in tests of 
earnings management for firms with extreme financial performance (Dechow, 1995). 
4.5 Listed 
     Unlisted companies differ from listed companies in a variety of ways. First of all, unlisted 
firms, externally operate without attracting institutional interest, scrutiny from regulators and the 
attention of media. Secondly, they concentrate more in cash flows than in reported earnings. The 
firm’s boards of directors often have a real ﬁnancial interest in the business and they have 
minimal concerns about the current shareholder’s value of the enterprise (Gottesman, 2003). On 
the other hand, listed companies, have to be very careful about their outside image as they want 
to attract institutional interest and the attention of media. External monitoring by the stakeholders 
such institutional investors and block-holders reduce the ability of the managers to 
opportunistically manage earnings. Highly sophisticated investors (like institutional or block-
holders) have the resources, ability, and opportunity to influence managers of a firm (Monks and 
Minow, 1995). They acquire the power to do this even as e functions of the size as individual or 
collective shareholdings (Chung, 2002). As a result there is less opportunity for accruals 
management or earnings manipulation (Yeo, 2002; De Bos and Donker, 2004). This will be 
especially the case when the incentives for earnings manipulation of the managers are known by 
the major stakeholders. On the contrary, if there are no incentives for the managers to use 
discretionary accruals then stakeholders will monitor less the discretionary accounting choices 
(Chung, 2002). 
     Furthermore, all publicly listed companies within the European Union are obliged to prepare 
their consolidated financial statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting 
Standards since 2005. The main goal of International Financial Reporting Standards is to 
improve transparency and provide international comparability of the financial statements of 
companies that apply them as mentioned by the study of Heemskerk and Van der Tas (2006). 
This would lead to the expectation that the implementation of International Financial Reporting 
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Standards in financial statements would decrease the possibility for earnings management 
because of the strict criteria that International Financial Reporting Standards has and the fact that 
there is very little room to deviate from these criteria. In the same line are the findings from the 
research by Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008). They state that the accounting quality of firms 
applying that International Financial Reporting Standards generally improves after the adoption 
period. They mentioned though, that it is not sure whether these findings are attributable to the 
change in the financial reporting system or to the changes in firms’ incentives and economic 
environment.  
     On the other hand, it is believed that the majority of listed companies consider the rationed 
share acquisition as the best channels for raising funds after they become public. However, it 
needs strict qualifications to attain the rationed share acquisition. Jiang Yihong (1999), Chen 
Xiaoyue, Xiao Xin, and Guo Xiaoyan (2000) and Pistor and Xu (2005) made empirical studies 
on Chinese companies, which concludes that the authorities of listed companies obviously make 
earnings management to attain the qualifications needed. It seems like listed firms have strong 
incentives to manage earnings in order to meet certain return on equity (ROE) thresholds. Chen 
and Yuan (2004) also find that Chinese listed firms manage earnings to satisfy the ROE 
requirements for rights issues, and argue that such earnings management behavior associates 
with mis-allocation of capital resources.  
     Yihong (1998) at his study claimed that when the listed companies expect that either the EPS 
will be less than zero or the return on equity (ROE) will be less than 10 percent, then these 
companies have drastic motives to manipulate profits in order to make the EPS slightly larger 
than zero or make the ROE slightly larger than 10 percent.  
     Another reason for earnings management seems to be the fact that in order to avoid being 
delisted, the listed companies manipulate their earnings at the level that earnings are expected to 
be. Jiang Yihong (1999) and Lu Jianqiao (1999) carry out profound research on the problem 
whether the listed companies take the earnings management to avoid it. In the above mentioned 
paper, Jiang Yihong demonstrates that the listed companies whose EPS are slightly higher than 
the critical point of profits and loss do have the behavior of  earnings management. 
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4.6 Implementation of Financial Fair Play Regulations  
     The introduction of the Financial Fair Play Regulations has not received much attention in the 
academic literature, although it is a very important issue.  There are few exception to this rule 
among which we could mention the research of Madden (2011), Vopel (2011), Drut and 
Raballand (2012) and Franck and Lang (2012). The study of Madden (2011) analyzes the 
consequences of the implementation of the Financial Fair Play Regulations according to the 
economic model of a sports league. He provides evidence to the assumption that the new 
regulations will have a negative impact on the supply of talent. He supports that the ‘missing’ 
money from the donors of the patrons will lead to a reduction in all team qualities which 
consequently will lead to fan disappointment, fall in owner’s utilities as well as decrease in 
player’s wages. Furthermore, Vopel (2011) at his research supports that the implementation of 
the Financial Fair Play Regulations could be inefficient in rebalancing completion. He claimed 
that a tighter regulation could lead to the protection of the well-established clubs from being 
challenged by non-established one. He also finds that the implementation cost for the clubs and 
the monitoring costs for the authorities to be high. Moreover, Drut and Raballand (2012) 
investigate the impact of the level of deficit that clubs are allowed to have on their performance 
on the field. They support that clubs that have deficits acquire better players, coaches and 
managers as a result they have better sportive results compared to clubs that have a more strict 
budget (as Financial Fair Play Regulations impose). Finally, Franck and Lang (2012) on their 
study developed a theoretical model in order to study the adverse incentive effects produced by 
the money injections. They claimed that the successful implementation of the Financial Fair Play 
Regulations will abrogate the mechanisms that allowed the external money injections on the 
football clubs. As a result, the clubs will choose a less risky investment strategy because it 
appears that the existence of external money injection induces the football clubs to choose a 
more risky strategy. Furthermore, they argue that a private money injection bails out the club less 
often than a public money injection. Moreover, their model shows that a ‘too-big-to-fail’ 
phenomenon exists because it is better to save a club if its market size is large. The also derive 
conditions under which the Financial Fair Play Regulations and the pre-Financial Fair Play 
Regulations, respectively, are desirable from a welfare perspective. 
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     All these studies investigate the implication of Financial Fair Play Regulations on different 
area. There is no research, at the best of our knowledge, which investigates the impact of the 
implementation of the Financial Fair Play Regulations on earnings management.  As we 
mentioned, the first season that UEFA will start monitoring clubs is the season 2013/14. In order 
to provide the license the authority will be based on information of the two preceding years, 
namely 2011/12 and 2012/13.  The break-even rule has to be fulfilled every year for a moving 
average over the tow previous years. It is expected that UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations 
will extrude managers to increase earnings manipulation of football clubs in order to comply 
with these rules. Although, the implementation period starts during 2011-2012 we expect that 
football clubs will start manipulating their earnings even during 2010-2011 in order to smooth 
the transition. 
H1: The implementation of FFP Regulations during 2011 is positively associated with the level 
of earnings management 
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Chapter 5: Date selection procedure and research design 
 
5.1 Introduction 
     This chapter describes the data selection procedure followed, the design steps and analysis of 
the model used. In the first section we describe the sources by which the necessary data used in 
our research were collected, while in the second section we set of the purpose of the research.  
5.2 Data selection Procedure 
     The research sample includes 84 Football Clubs from 14 countries, namely Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Ukraine, 
United Kingdom, Norway and Poland for the period 2009-2011. Our initial sample included 88 
football clubs but we removed those clubs which do not had the accounting information needed 
for our research, thus limiting the final number to 84 football clubs. The main criterion that the 
selected football flubs had to fulfill was to have included in their annual reports full financial 
data and to close their fiscal year in June. All the clubs had in their financial statement data 
regarding Club’s fixed assets, total assets, shareholders funds, total liabilities, operating revenue, 
operating P/L, net income and cash flow. 
     The research sample is restricted only to football clubs that participate in the elite division of 
each country’s official championship. The reason why we choose only those that participate in 
the elite division is because they attract greater publicity, their financial statements provide more 
reliability as they are audited by certified chartered accountants and we wanted to mitigate any 
biases arising from the relegation of football clubs to lower divisions. Also, clubs that participate 
in the elite division are highly capitalized and are in the forefront of the national championships. 
They are the only contestants for participation in the UEFA championships and thus are the only 
clubs with intense scrutiny by the local and European regulators. Their frequent participation in 
the UEFA competitions make them more attractive as they attract the interest of the public, fans, 
investor, regulators and other stakeholders. All the data were collected from Amadeus database 
which had the financial statements of football clubs and no further trimming was conducted as 
we did not wanted to lose any observation which would lead to a biased final outcome. 
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5.3 Research Design 
     The selection of the variables used in our research, was based on previous research which 
have been shown to be significant determinants of the accounting quality and the fact that we 
wanted to capture the differences in the incentives of earnings management. The first variable 
that we controlled is the size of football clubs which is measured as the natural logarithm of total 
assets at the end of the fiscal year. As previous researches have shown, the larger companies are, 
the less they tend to manage their earnings mainly because of the regulatory scrutiny that large 
and profitable firms face. For this reason, we expect a negative relation between the size (LnTA) 
of football clubs and the tendency to report positive earnings. 
     Also we controlled the impact of football clubs leverage in earnings management incentives. 
We measured the leverage (LEV) as the ratio of year-end total liabilities to year-end total 
common equity. According to Billings (1999) and Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), firms 
with high leverage ratio engage more in upward earnings management because they want to 
avoid debt covenant violations. Another recent research
10
, showed that managers may avoid 
reporting losses because they want to increase the ability of servicing the existing debt through 
new debt financing. For example, European football clubs
11
, which are willing to lose in order to 
enhance the on field performance. Therefore, we expect that leverage will not only be positively 
related with earnings management but also with the tendency of reporting small positive income. 
     Another variable that we controlled is the growth of football clubs (GR) which is measured as 
the percentage change of the company’s sales from year t-1 to t. According to the study in 2006 
by Lee, Li and Yu, firms that have high growth tend to manipulate more their earnings than low 
growth firms. Also, the argument
12
 that high growth firms have more incentives to manipulate 
earnings in order to meet the analysts’ forecast was verified by many studies13. Thus, we expect 
that high growth football clubs to manipulate more the firm’s earnings leading to a positive GR 
coefficient. 
                                                          
10 Iqbal and Strong (2010) 
11
 Garcia-del-Barrio and Szymanski (2009). 
12
 Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003). 
13
 Clinch (1991), Gaver and Gaver (1993), Ittner, Lambert and Larcker (2002) and Iyengar, Land and Zampelli (2010). 
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     The fourth variable that we included in our research is the ratio of cash flows deflated by 
lagged total assets. Two recent researches have been made regarding the importance of cash 
flows. Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2009) found that cash flows provide notable information 
about the quality of accounting information which every firm publish. Iqbal and Strong (2010) 
suggested that firms that have increased cash flows have fewer incentives to manipulate 
accounting numbers through accruals than firms with decreasing cash flows. Thus, we expect 
that the variable of cash flows to have a negative coefficient. 
     We also wanted to investigate if the listed companies that mandatorily implement 
International Financial Reporting Standards are negatively or not correlated with earnings 
management. Prior research of Barth (2008) found that companies which voluntary adopted 
International Financial Reporting Standards decreased earnings management. There are also 
studies who investigate the usefulness of International Financial Reporting Standards adoption, 
Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008), Callao and Jarne (2010), Hoque (2012) concluding that countries 
which adopt International Financial Reporting Standards have lower earnings management. As 
we mentioned, the adaption of International Financial Reporting Standards is mandatory for the 
listed companies. As a result, we expect listed clubs that report under International Financial 
Reporting Standards to have lower earnings manipulation. Furthermore, it seems that listed 
companies have to be very careful about signals they give to the investors avoiding as a result to 
involve in earnings management. Thus, we expect listed football clubs that have adopted 
International Financial Reporting Standards to have better earnings quality.  
     Moreover, we included the V-Year variable in order to see if football clubs are manipulating 
earnings after the implementation of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations.  V-Year is a 
dummy variable that receives ‘1’ if year is 2011 and ‘0’ otherwise. As we mentioned above, the 
Financial Fair Play Regulations will start implicating from the 2013-14 season. Thus, football 
clubs should have in mind the rules and start complying with those starting from 2011-12 season 
because the 2011-12 and 2012-13 seasons are used to determine a club’s license application in 
the 2013-14 season.  But we expect that football clubs will start manipulating their earnings even 
during 2010-2011 in order to smooth the transition from the huge losses that they reported all 
these years to the proper earnings/losses that UEFA require them to report. 
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     In this part of our study, we include the estimation of two measures of earnings management. 
The first measure is income smoothing which is the most common practice of earnings 
management. Income smoothing refers to the process of using accounting policies and processes 
in order to eliminate changes in the firm’s earnings between periods. This is mostly used by 
company’s managers that want to appear more lucrative to potential risk aversion investors. 
According to Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008), investors believe that profits are more reliable 
when their expected level is closer to their actual level. This reliability is decreased when there is 
a large deviation of the expected level from the actual level. As a result, firms managers are 
motivated to change (reduce) the variance of the firm’s profit stream so as to mitigate the 
perceived firm risk.  In this study, will be implemented a commonly used measure of income 
smoothing, Spearman correlation, between accruals and cash flow of football clubs for every 
given year. Our next step was to adopt the methodology proposed by Barth, Landsman, and Lang 
(2008) in order to capture any confounding effects of factors that are not attributable to the 
financial reporting setting. According to this methodology, we compared the correlations of the 
accruals’ and of the cash flows’ residuals from the below regression models, instead of 
comparing the correlations of accruals and cash flows directly. 
CF and ACCRUALS residuals are estimated form the following models: 
CFit = a0 + a1SIZEit + a2GRit + a3LEVit + a4DLISTit + eit                                                (1) 
ACCit = a0 + a1SIZEit + a2GRit + a3LEVit + a4DLISTit + eit                                                      (2)  
 
Where: 
 CFit is the annual operating cash flow divided by lagged total assets. 
 ACCit is the total accruals measured as the difference between net income and cash flow 
divided by lagged total assets. 
 SIZEit is the natural logarithm of end year total assets. 
 GRit   is the percentage change in operating revenue. 
 LEVit is the ratio of end year total liabilities to end of year total common equity. 
 DLIST is a dummy receiving (1) for publicly listed football clubs and (0) otherwise. 
    
34 
 
  Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008), found a more negative correlation between accruals and 
cash flows as earnings smoothing due to the fact that managers will increase accruals in the case 
of poor cash flow outcomes. This means that they will increase net income since accruals are the 
difference between net income and cash flows.  
     The detection of earnings management is a topic of considerable interest and importance to a 
variety of interested groups including investors, auditors and regulators
14
. Despite the fact that 
academic research has addressed possible causes and consequences of earnings management, the 
measurement of earnings management continues to focus on the model of expected accruals first 
identified by Jones (1991). Accruals in accounting refer to the account on the balance sheet that 
represent liabilities and non cash based assets including accounts payable, accounts receivable, 
goodwill, deferred tax liability and future interest expenses.  In other words, accruals include all 
the revenues and expenses that have incurred but are not paid or received. Accruals are estimated 
as the difference between net income and operating cash flows. Accruals are categorized into 
normal accruals and discretionary accruals. The normal component reflects business conditions 
that naturally create and destroy accruals, while the discretionary component identifies 
management choices where managers choose by themselves the level of manipulation. Examples 
of discretionary accruals are the disclosure of amortization expenses and depreciation prior to 
initial public offering and disclosing increased provisions for deferred taxation. 
     In our research, we will use the cross sectional model of Jones (1991) which was modified by 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) so as to extract the discretionary accruals following a 
performance matching approach. The following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) equation of 
discretionary accruals is a function of changes in sales, the level of property plant and equipment 
and the level of the return on assets: 
 
ACCit/Tat-1 = α0 + α(1/TAt-1) +β(ΔSalesit/TAt-1) +γ(PPEit/TAt-1) +gROAit +eit                               (3a) 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 Fields et al (2001) 
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Where: 
 ACC is the total accrual measured as the difference between net income and operating 
cash flows divided by lagged total assets. 
 ΔSales is the change in net sales deflated by lagged total assets. 
 PPE is the level of property plant and equipment for each year deflated by lagged total 
assets. 
 ROA is the return on equity at the end of the fiscal year. 
 TA is the total asset of the firm at the end of the fiscal year. 
 
     The Jones model (1991) included a constant term which according to Kothari, Leone and 
Wasley (2005), provides an additional control for heteroskedasticity that was not improved by 
deflating all the variables with firm’s total assets. They argued that the constant term mitigates 
problems which can arise from the omitted size variable producing a more symmetric 
discretionary accrual measure. This measure makes the power of test comparisons more clear 
and overcomes misspecifications of the model. Also Jones (1991) included the return on assets 
(ROA) which increases the effectiveness of the performance matching methodology. The below 
equation shows the residuals estimated by the modified model of Jones (1991): 
DACit = ACCit/TAit-1 - â (1/TAit-1) + (ΔSalesit/TAit-1)+(PPEit/TAit-1)+ ROA                    (3b) 
 
 
     According to Bowen, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2003), Klein (2002), Reynolds and 
Francis (2000), Wang (2006) and Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) it is most appropriate to use 
absolute values of discretionary accruals because manager can use income increasing or 
decreasing accruals in order to achieve their earnings targets. The higher the absolute value of 
the discretionary accruals the greater the level of earning manipulation that the company is 
involved in. The model that we use in order to test the research hypothesis is: 
 
|DACC it|= a0 + a1Year dummies+ a2DLISTit + a3VyearDLISTit +a4SIZEit + a5LEVit + a6Cfta + 
a7GRit + bCountry dummies + eit                                                                                (4) 
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Where,  
 |DACC it| is the dependent variable of the absolute discretionary accruals. 
 SIZEit is the natural logarithm of end year total assets. 
 GRit   is the percentage change in operating revenue. 
 LEVit is the ratio of end year total liabilities to end of year total common equity. 
 DLIST is a dummy receiving (1) for publicly listed football clubs and (0) otherwise. 
 Cfta is the ratio of cash flows deflated by lagged total assets. 
 VyearDLIST is the combination of the year dummies and DLIST. 
     Based on our research hypotheses we expected coefficients a1, a5, and a7 to have positive 
signs, while coefficients a2, a3, a4 and a6 are expected to be negative.  In the equation are 
included country dummies in order to control for any unobservable country-specific effects and 
year dummies to capture time specific effects and also to deal with the problem of 
heteroskedasticity in the error term. 
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Chapter 6: Data Analysis and Empirical Results 
 
6.1 Introduction 
     The first sub-chapter is dedicated to descriptive statistics and correlation of the data used in 
this study. We, then, proceed with empirical results based on regression analysis using 
discretionary accruals and Spearman correlation coefficients between accruals and cash flows 
residuals. 
6.2 Descriptive statistics and correlation 
     The table below (Table 1) presents the Pearson correlation coefficients of sample variables for 
the period under investigation (2009-2011). The absolute value of discretionary accruals is 
negatively correlated with the size of the football clubs (-0.224), according to which the larger 
the size of companies is, the lower the levels of accruals and enhanced earnings management that 
the company engaged in, verifying the argument of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) who support 
that the larger the firm size, the less earnings management may be feasible.  
 
 |DACC| SIZE LEV GROWTH DLIST CFTA VYEAR 
|DACC| 1 -0.224 -0.002 0.012 -0.142 0.028 -0.018 
SIZE  1 -0.055 0.013 0.0372 0.142 0.004 
LEV   1 -0.012 -0.050 0.024 0.105 
GROWTH    1 -0.018 0.004 -0.045 
DLIST     1 0.021 0.000 
CFTA      1 0.078 
VYEAR       1 
Table 1: Pearson correlation coefficients of sample variables (2009-2011) 
Notes: All the coefficients in bold indicate statistical significance at the 5% or 10% level (two-tailed test). The 
sample includes data from 84 football clubs from 14 countries during the period 2009-2011. |DACC| is the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals estimated from the Jones (1991) model as modified by Kothari et al. (2005), SIZE is 
the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the fiscal year, LEV is the ratio of total debt to common equity, GR 
is the annual percentage change in sales, DLIST is a dummy receiving (1) for publicly listed football clubs and (0) 
otherwise, CFTA is the ratio of cash flows to lagged total assets, and VYEAR is a dummy variable receiving ‘1’ if 
year is 2011 and ‘0’ otherwise. 
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     Discretionary accruals are also negatively correlated with the variable of DLIST (-0.142) 
indicating the negative association between listed firms that apply International Financial 
Reporting Standards and accruals, as we expected. It is believed that listed companies should be 
careful about the message they send to the public. Market pressure force listed clubs to report 
their true economic situation. Investors through the continuous monitoring of the financial 
performance of the corporation influence managers to reduce earnings management (Monks and 
Minow, 1995). Furthermore, football clubs that have adopted IFRS usually tend to avoid 
earnings management because of the strict criteria that International Financial Reporting 
Standards have and the fact that there is very little room to deviate from these criteria as Barth, 
Landsman and Lang (2008) supported in their research. Also, football club’s size is positively 
correlated with DLIST variable (0.0372). This positive relationship indicates that large 
companies are more possible to be listed. The additional cost that a club should bear in order to 
be listed could be a possible explanation for this, indicating that small-size clubs cannot afford 
being listed. On the other hand, that also means that large size football clubs appears to have 
more sophisticated system in adopting new standards like IFRS as compared to small-sized. As a 
result, these clubs have better comparability and transparency which could lead to lower earnings 
management (as mentioned above the larger a club is the lower its earnings manipulation). 
Finally, the ratio of cash flows to lagged total assets is positively correlated with the football 
club’s size (0.142) meaning that the larger the club is, the higher the available cash it has. Iqbal 
and Strong (2010) suggested that firms that have increased cash flows have fewer incentives to 
manipulate accounts that support our initial claim that large firm (which has more available cash 
flows) involve less in earnings manipulation. 
     Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample variables for period 2009-2011. As we 
observe, the absolute value of discretionary accruals is almost 10% of the average total assets. 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
|DACC| 0.00 0.82 0.0997 0.10306 
SIZE 12.60 20.20 17.1721 1.69393 
LEV -68.46 454.34 8.1241 42.98747 
GROWTH -0.91 1.44E7 5.8252E4 9.15489E5 
DLIST 0.00 1.00 0.0723 0.25949 
CFTA -54.73 9.33 -0.1675 3.58629 
VYEAR 0.00 1.00 0.3333 0.47235 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of sample variables (2009-2011) 
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Notes: All the coefficients in bold indicate statistical significance at the 5% or 10% level (two-tailed test). The 
sample includes data from 84 football clubs from 14 countries during the period 2009-2011. |DACC| is the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals estimated from the Jones (1991) model as modified by Kothari et al. (2005), SIZE is 
the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the fiscal year, LEV is the ratio of total debt to common equity, GR 
is the annual percentage change in sales, DLIST is a dummy receiving (1) for publicly listed football clubs and (0) 
otherwise, CFTA is the ratio of cash flows to lagged total assets, and VYEAR is a dummy variable receiving ‘1’ if 
year is 2011 and ‘0’ otherwise.   
 
     The football club’s size is quite high. This could be explained by the fact that football clubs 
are large size firms, especially those that belong in the elite division. They are highly leveraged 
(this is one of the reasons why UEFA introduced the Financial Fair Play Regulation, as we have 
already mentioned), do not have enough growth opportunities and they tend to generate negative 
operating cash flows this is probably because of the fact that the debt repayments of the loan that 
clubs have granted decrease the amount of available cash (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Dichev 
and Skinner, 2002; Sweeney, 1994). 
6.3 Empirical Results for Earnings Management 
     The table below represents the empirical findings from the equation 4. The model captures the 
possibility that football managers exercise discretion in order to avoid reporting losses. As 
shown, the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables is 
statistically significant (x
2
= 341.21, p<0.001). Also, the association strength between the 
dependent and the independent variables (overall R
2
) is 30.69%, indicating a medium efficient 
strong relationship. The results indicate that the implementation of Financial Fair Play 
Regulations is a mechanism which increases earnings management behavior. Specifically, during 
2011 (the year that we expect football clubs to start manipulating their earnings due to the 
implementation of Financial Fair Play Regulations) managers of football clubs tend to manage 
the company’s earnings more since the correlation coefficient is positive (0.0050962) and 
statistically significant. This verifies the argument of our main hypothesis which support that the 
implementation of Financial Fair Play Regulations, during 2011, is positively associated with the 
level of earnings management. 
      On the other hand, listed clubs are negatively correlated with earnings management (-
0.0478303). As we see, the coefficient of the variable is negative and statistically significant at 
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1% significance level. There are studies supporting these results arguing that the sophisticated 
investors are less likely to be fooled by earnings management. They inhibit the listed firms’ 
managers from using discretionary accounting accruals opportunistically (Chung, Firth and Kim, 
2002). In contrast, when the club is unlisted then there is narrow separation between owners and 
managers. Consequently, managers face less pressure from financial markets. They do not have 
to worry about the signal the firm gives to the market paying in this way less consideration to the 
short-term financial report (Jensen, 1986) and (Klassen, 1997). Thus, highly managerial 
ownership clubs are more likely to involve in earnings management due to this lack of market 
discipline which may lead insiders to make accounting choices that reflect personal motives 
rather than firm economics (Sanchez-Ballesta and Garsa-Meca, 2007). Moreover, the 
implementation of IFRS reduces earnings manipulation. Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008), Callao 
and Jarne (2010), Hoque (2012) at their research support  that companies which adopt 
International Financial Reporting Standards have lower earnings management. These findings 
are also consistent with aim of these regulators according to which the adoption of  standards 
increases the comparability of financial statements, improves corporate transparency and 
increases the quality of financial reporting.  
     The growth rate (-9.93e-10) seems also to affect negatively the earnings management since its 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant (at 1% significance level). The results 
confirmed our initial expectation which was based on previous studies like the one of Lee, Li and 
Yu (2006) who supported that club’s growth rate is positively associated with the level of 
earnings management. This negative relationship could be explained by the fact that clubs with 
high growth opportunities have no more incentives to manage their earnings because they may 
expect to achieve the UEFA’s target (break-even point) through the increase of their revenue. 
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[DACC] Coefficient Significance 
vyear  0.0050962 0.010* 
Dlist  -0.0478303  0.001* 
Vyeardlist 0 .0047171  0.158** 
Size  -0.0145696  0.125** 
Leverage  4.39e-06  0.965 
 Cfta  .001375  0.179 
Growth  -9.93e-10  0.001* 
X
2
 
Overall R
2 
Country dummies Included 
341.21 
30.69% 
Included 
0.000* 
Table 3: Regression results on earnings management using discretionary accruals 
Notes: *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively (p-value with two tailed test). 
     Furthermore, size has negative coefficient (statistically significant at level 5%) meaning that 
the large-size clubs are less associated with earnings management in comparison to the small-
size clubs. As we expected, club’s size is negatively associated with the level of earnings 
management. One possible explanation for this fact is that large-size firms take more into 
account their reputation costs when engaging in earnings management in comparison to the 
small-size firm. The results are in the same line with the study of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
in which they provide evidence to the idea that the larger the firm is the less it involves in 
earnings manipulation. 
     The ratio of cash flows divided by total asset and clubs leverage have positive coefficients 
meaning they influence positively the level of earnings management but are not statistically 
significant neither at 1% nor at 5% significance level.  
     Although the variable of vyeardlist, which shows the combination of the year variable and the 
variable of DLIST, is positive (and statistically significant at 5% significance level) we can 
conclude that the listed company reduce earnings management. This is due to the fact that the 
coefficient of this variable is lower than the coefficient of the Vyear meaning that we have lower 
level of earnings manipulation. This could be explained by the fact that listed companies face 
more market pressure. Moreover, listed companies are audited more carefully as there is more 
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possible auditors to get lawsuit by investors if the fail to properly audit the club. Furthermore, as 
we mentioned the adaption of IFRS is mandatory for listed companies. Although, researches 
have not concluded yet, it appears that the adaption of IFRS reduces the level of earnings 
manipulation. 
Table 4: Regression results on earnings management using discretionary accruals 
Notes: *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively (p-value with two tailed test). 
     Regarding the country dummies, football clubs of some countries seem to involve more in 
earnings management than others. To be more specific, Czech Republic and Spain although 
involve positively in earnings management the coefficient is statistically insignificant. Greece on 
the other hand has a positive coefficient but significant only at 10% significance level. 
Conversely, Netherlands, Ukraine and United Kingdom have negative coefficients but are 
 [DACC] Coefficient Significance 
Belgium -.0968541 0.000* 
Czech Republic .0392348 0.425 
Denmark -.0786522 0.000* 
Finland -.1274754 0.002* 
France -.0735202 0.000* 
Germany -.0743123 0.002* 
Greece .0662662 0.072** 
Italy -.0683085 0.000* 
Netherlands -.0365595 0.120** 
Spain .0152357 0.600 
Ukraine -.0412486 0.432 
United Kingdom -.0240679 0.162 
Norway -.109176 0.010* 
Poland -.0615653 0.012* 
X
2
 
Overall R
2 
Country dummies Included 
341.21 
30.69% 
Included 
0.000* 
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statically insignificant. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway and Poland 
have also negative coefficients but are statistically significant at 1% significance level. That 
means that football clubs located in one of these countries involve less in earnings management. 
     The tables below,  present Spearman correlation coefficients between the sample variables for 
the period before the implementation of the UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations (2009- 
2010) and the period after the FFP (2011). 
Correlations Cash Flow 2011 Accruals Residuals 2011 
Cash Flow of 2011 1 -0.413 
Accruals Residuals of 2011 -0.413 1 
Table 5: Spearman correlation coefficients between accruals and cash flows residuals 2011 
Number of observation: 83 
Notes: the Correlation is significant at the 1% level (two tailed test). 
Correlations Cash Flow 2009-2010 Accruals Residuals 2009-2010 
Cash Flow of 2009-2010 1 0.003 
Accruals Residuals of 2009-2010 0.003 1 
Table 6: Spearman correlation coefficients between accruals and cash flows residuals 2011 
Number of observation: 164 
     As we observe, the correlation coefficient between the cash flows of 2009-2010 and the 
accruals residuals of the same period, was positive (0,003) but insignificant.  On the other hand, 
the correlation coefficient between cash flow of 2011 and accruals residuals of the same period 
was negative (-0.413) indicating the negative association between cash flows and accruals 
residuals. Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008) at their study supported that the more negative the 
correlation between accruals and cash flows is, the higher the income smoothing that the 
company involves in. A possible explanation seems to be the fact that managers respond to poor 
cash flow outcomes by increasing accruals. The results provide some initial support to our 
hypothesis which suggests that clubs increase earnings manipulation during 2011 in order to 
comply with the Financial Fair Play Regulations.  
 
44 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion, Limitations, Contribution and Recommendations  
 
     The scope of this study was to investigate the impact of the implementation of the Financial 
Fair Play Regulations on the quality of the accounting earnings of the European football clubs. 
The sample includes financial data of 84 football clubs from 14 countries for the period 2009-
2011. The earnings management was measured by income smoothing and accruals manipulation. 
This study gives evidence to the assumption that the implementation of the Financial Fair Play 
Regulations will increase earnings manipulation dictating the necessity of authorities 
(government, auditors) to take all the appropriate actions in order to protect the interests of 
shareholders and various stakeholders. Specifically, our findings suggest that clubs increased 
earnings management during 2011 in order to comply with the regulations of UEFA. It appears, 
though, that listed clubs involve less in earnings management. 
     The findings of this study could prove useful to regulators, auditors, stakeholders and 
managers of football clubs since they have policy implications for all these related parties. 
Regulators should take into consideration that football clubs might use earnings management in 
order to achieve the objectives that UEFA has set. It will be necessary for the regulators to 
carefully control the accounting numbers that clubs will provide to them in order to get the 
license. Furthermore, the auditors should also be cautious when auditing football clubs because 
the latter have a significant reason to manipulate their financial statements. Considering the 
stakeholders of the clubs, they must bear in mind that the reported earnings may deviate from the 
actual earnings of the club. They should require supplementary information in order to reach a 
better decision because earnings might not be highly informative. Among the major stakeholders 
of the clubs are the banks because the majority of the clubs are unlisted and the only source of 
financing is the banking sector. Undoubtedly, banks require transparent and reliable information 
in order to provide liquidity to the clubs. As a result, managers of the football clubs should keep 
in mind that a bad quality of financial reporting will not only prevent football clubs from 
granting the license to play in the UEFA’s championship but also will cause liquidity problems 
to them. 
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     Despite the fact that our research was based in methods proposed by the related literature, 
there are three limitations that should be highlighted.  The first limitation is the difficulty of 
finding football clubs that have the necessary data for the period under investigation. This 
resulted to a small final sample for the estimation of regression and may lead us to a biased 
result. Secondly, the data span a relatively short time period (2009-2011). Finally, the third 
limitation of this study is that the implementation of the Financial Fair Play Regulations requires 
that football clubs should assess the break-even point covering the financial years ending 2012 
and 2013.  Thus, we believe that earnings manipulation will be even higher during these periods. 
The contribution of this research to the literature is that it investigates the impact of the UEFA’s 
Financial Fair Play Regulations on earnings management of European football clubs by 
examining a sample for the period 2009-2011. 
     The suggestions for future research concern the extension of the present findings for further 
investigation of this study. For instance, doing the same research, by examining relation between 
the implementation of the Financial Fair Play Regulations and earnings quality during 2012 and 
2013 when clubs are expected to increase the earnings management in order to grant the license 
in order to be able to attend UEFA’s championship. 
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